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The UNE Anticommons: Why the 1996 Telecom
Reforms Blocked Innovation and Investment
Michael A. Hellert
The United States is losing its competitive edge in telecommunications
partly because of FCC mistakes in fragmenting property rights in, and in the
regulatory oversight of local telephone facilities and services. As with post-
socialist transition, reformers created a "tragedy of the anticommons" in
which too many owners and regulators each can block the others' investments
and all players forego innovation. By forcing existing companies to unbundle
network elements (UNEs) and sell them too cheaply, the FCC has created an
industry where the players cannibalize the legacy network, divert resources to
regulatory arbitrage, and have little incentive for bold new investments.
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Introduction
Why is the United States losing its role as a global pacesetter for
telecommunications innovation? For example, why is the new Japanese and
South Korean broadband an order of magnitude faster than the United States
standard?' The answer depends, in part, on a host of familiar explanations
t Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to John Thorne and to
participants at the Manhattan Institute conference, Avoiding a Tragedy of the Telecommons: Finding
the Right Property Rights Regime for Telecommunications (May 17, 2004). Thanks also to Verizon
Communications for financial support at the editing stage of this article.
I See, e.g., Roger 0. Crockett, How To Get US Broadband up to Speed, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE, Sept. 8, 2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/0336/b3848084
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regarding private entrepreneurial energy, America's geographic sprawl,
government industrial policy, and so on. But in significant measure, the
comparative shortfall in telecom investment and innovation results from a badly
drawn property rights regime. Small mistakes in how those rights are
structured have large, but often invisible, ripple effects downstream.
This Article argues that badly drawn property rights are discouraging
telecom competition and investment, and imposing large, hidden economic
costs. 2 The costs of foregone telecom investments -can be striking. For
example, FCC regulatory hurdles are thought to have delayed introduction of
cellular wireless in the United States by ten to fifteen years, with a cost in lost
consumer welfare of perhaps $33 billion per year.3 Broadband now appears to
be suffering a similar fate.
All investment and innovation requires a coherent property rights
structure. But certain economic sectors, such as telecom, are particularly
sensitive to the regulatory climate. Telecom typically requires large up-front
capital investments, followed by lower cost marginal investments to extend
networks. In this sense, telecom resembles pharmaceuticals with its large initial
push to discover drugs but low marginal costs to produce the actual pills. 4 For
such industries, the incentives to invest and innovate depend largely on the
initial specification and security of property rights. Why invest at all if others
can free ride on successful projects later?
In a somewhat less obvious way, telecom also resembles the mortgage
finance or insurance sectors-investments made today may take years or
decades to pay off profitably.5 For such investments, long-term stability of
property rights proves crucially important to ex ante investment decision-
mz063.htm (quoting one investment analyst's statement that the United States "is on training wheels"
when it comes to broadband); George Gilder, Stop the Broadbandits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2004, at
A16 ("Although by conventional measures the US now ranks 11th among nations in broadband
penetration, by Asian standards the U.S. has no household connections at all. South Koreans and
Japanese enjoy links some 10-to-50 times faster than our fastest connections to homes.").
2 See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-
Based Investment?, 4 ToPICS EcoN. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 2, 3 & n.6 (2004) (discussing the theoretical
and anecdotal linkages between unbundling and the incentives to invest by both incumbent providers
and competitive carriers); Allan T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P,
and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?,
20 YALE J. ON REG. 389, 404 (2003) (reporting empirical findings that TELRIC pricing has decreased
ILECs' incentives to invest in their own networks).
3 Jerry Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS (1997); see also Kenneth Arrow et al.,
Nobelists' Report for Verizon 10-11,23 (Nov. 18, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("Even modest delays in new product introduction can have significant adverse effects on consumer
welfare.").
4 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S: Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
For a cross-country analysis showing the role of a stable regulatory framework for the




making. Why invest today when you face a long future of capricious
regulation?
Smart telecom regulation requires a lot from regulators: both a coherent
initial specification of property rights, and an up-front, believable commitment
to stability regarding those rights. The current telecom regulatory regime
provides neither coherence nor stability. More specifically, the FCC's tortured
attempts to implement the 1996 Telecommunications Act illustrate exactly
how not to create property rights if one's goal is to spur innovation or
investment. The FCC's regulatory efforts have created an alphabet soup of
players-ILECs, CLECs, CAPs, and BOCs-fighting over an array of
property-UNEs, EELs, BSEs, and CPEs.' You know the government has
made a hash of policy when it is impossible even to write a sentence in the
field without resort to multiple acronyms.
This Article explains how recent telecom policy has gone astray through
the prism of the "tragedy of the anticommons" metaphor.' This metaphor
points attention to the potential underuse of scarce resources that may emerge
when property rights are broken up too much. When there are too many hands
stirring the pot, each user may block the others, coordination becomes difficult,
investment is deterred, and resources are wasted. Part I of this Article explains
the tragedy of the anticommons metaphor. Part II shows how this metaphor
helps illuminate the stakes in the fight over "unbundled network elements"
(UNEs) and why the anticommons tragedy might matter to innovation and
investment. As the D.C. Circuit wrote recently, each unbundling of an element
imposes costs of its own, spreading the disincentive to invest in innovation
and creating complex issues of managing shared facilities. 8 A brief Conclusion
reiterates the main point: that the structure and stability of property rights can
matter as much as clarity.
Regulators often overlook the danger that shifting property rights around
is not always a positive sum game, nor even zero sum. Poorly crafted property
rights can create an anticommons tragedy, a negative sum game in which the
overall value that scarce resources contribute to society is less than the sum of
the parts. As with failed socialist policies in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, to date, the FCC's implementation of the 1996 Act seems
positively value-destroying.
6 For a thorough introduction to these terms and to the controversies surrounding
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, see Chapters I and 2 of PETER W. HUBER ET
AL., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW (2d ed. Supp. 2004).
7 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
9 United States Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 295 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Yale Journal on Regulation
I. Defining a Tragedy of the Anticommons
A. Mirroring Commons Tragedy
In 1967, Garrett Hardin introduced the metaphor "tragedy of the
commons" to help explain overpopulation, air pollution, and species
extinction.9 People often overuse resources they own in common because they
have no incentive to conserve. Today, Hardin's metaphor is central to debates
in economics, law, and science, and a powerful justification for privatizing
commons property. While Hardin's metaphor highlights the cost of overuse
when governments allow too many people to use a scarce resource, it misses
the possibility of underuse when governments give too many people rights to
exclude others.
Anticommons property can best be understood as the mirror image of
commons property. A resource is prone to overuse in a tragedy of the
commons when too many owners each have a privilege to. use a given resource,
and no one has a right to exclude another. By contrast, a resource is prone to
underuse in a tragedy of the anticommons when multiple owners each have a
right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
privilege of use. In theory, in a world of costless transactions, people could
always avoid common or anticommons tragedy by trading their rights. In
practice, however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs,
strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of participants, with success more
likely within close-knit communities than among hostile strangers, as in our
telecom example. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable
private property is often brutal and slow. In the. interim, valuable resources are
stranded in inefficient uses while regulators and owners battle to sort out a more
sensible property rights regime.
B. Two Evocative Examples
I first developed the anticommons concept by looking at privatization in
post-socialist economies." One promise of transition to markets was that new
entrepreneurs would fill the stores that socialist rule had left bare. Yet after
several years of reform, many privatized storefronts remained empty, while
flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, mushroomed up on the streets.
Why did the new merchants not come in from the cold?
9 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCiENcE.1243 (1967).
10 See James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons,
43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000).




When privatizing stores, Russia's leaders had been determined to give
socialist managers a stake in reform. So they re-labeled many old socialist
interests as private property. One old socialist manager received the "right to
sell" a store, a second to "lease" out the same store, a third to "occupy" it, and
so on. To open a store, an aspiring merchant had to assemble a bundle of
rights.' 2 Any one owner could block the deal, and often did. Rather than agree
to share the rent, many new owners felt entitled to it all. So leasing stores
proved slow and brutal. Hand grenades and drive-by shootings, rather than
handshakes and deal-making, sorted out many early conflicts. By contrast,
kiosks were a safer bet. To open an illegal kiosk on a sidewalk, an entrepreneur
had only to bribe a few local officials and pay a mafia gang for protection.
A second example can be seen in the privatization of upstream biomedical
research in the United States.' 4 In this setting, privatization takes the form of
intellectual property claims to the sorts of research results that, in an earlier era,
would have been made freely available in the public domain. In biomedical
research, as in post-socialist transition, privatization holds both promises and
risks. Patents and other forms of intellectual property protection for upstream
discoveries may fortify incentives to undertake risky research projects and could
lead to a more equitable distribution of profits across all stages of R&D.
But privatization can go astray when too many owners hold rights in prior
discoveries that constitute obstacles to future research. Upstream patent rights,
initially offered to help attract further private investment, are increasingly
regarded as entitlements by those who do research with public funds. The result
has been a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners,
reaching ever further upstream in the course of biomedical research. Each
upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to
product development, possibly adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovation.'5
12 Heller, supra note 7, at 633-42.
"a id. at 642-47.
14 See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 4.
15 The FTC recently issued a report suggesting the possibility of anticommons tragedy in the
biotech area. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITITON AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003). For a skeptical reply, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
& BRUCE N. KUHLIK, NAVIGATING THE ANTICOMMONS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: STEADY THE
COURSE ON HATCH-WAXMAN (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 209, 2004); see
also John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (reporting
survey findings that respondents did not see patent blockades emerging).
Yale Journal on Regulation
II. Anticommons in the Telecom Sector
A. Early "Successes"
Reforms in the telecom sector parallel the post-socialist transition quite
closely. For most of its history, telecom was understood as a naturalS 16
monopoly, and operated largely within a dense regulatory environment.
Similar to their socialist counterparts, federal and state regulators micro-
managed rates, returns, and indirectly, the pace and direction of investment and
innovation. Privatization of both socialist and telecom sectors has not been a
single uni-directional story of success or failure. Paying close attention to the
details of property rights created during privatization turns out to matter
crucially. For example, in the post-socialist Russian context, housing
privatization mostly succeeded quite rapidly because, for the most part,
homeowners received the apartments they already occupied, but enterprise
privatization was much more fraught because of the more convoluted property
rights regime that privatizers imposed.
Similarly, in the telecom sector, privatization has had quite a varied
history. Consider "customer premises equipment," that is, the telephone
attached to the wall in your home. For decades, telephone customers could not
attach their own phones inside their homes, but were limited to the bland
choices provided by the phone monopolies.' 7 The struggle over innovation
here was not technological in any significant way, but largely about regulatory
leverage and control,' a hallmark of socialist systems as well. Moving this
tiny aspect of the telecom world from the regulated to the competitive market
took over twenty years, finally culminating in the mid-1970s.19
In a sense, creation of competitive markets for "consumer premises
equipment" was a success in that a new property rights regime catalyzed
creation of a vibrant market without destroying underlying incentives for
investment in the sector and without stranding massive investments by the
regulated monopolies. But against this success must be counted the direct costs
of regulatory battle, along with the indirect costs of consumer welfare lost
during a twenty-year period of non-innovation. So, even a successful story of
"post-socialist" telecom reform must be given a tempered review.
The recent history of telecom has been one of increasing privatization and
competition, along more and more margins of the industry, including wireless,
long distance, and information services. Each of these examples though has a
16 The historical material on telecom privatization in this Section is drawn from HUBER ET
AL., supra note 6, at 1-35.
"7 Id. at 50 ("The Bell tariffs contained various foreign attachment provisions that prohibited
any non-Bell System product from being interconnected with Bell's network.").
18 See, e.g., id. at 51 (discussing lengthy regulatory battle over telephone interconnections).
19 Id. at 50-53.
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structure similar to the battle over consumer premises equipment. Stories of
success must be qualified by noting the costs of foregone investment from
regulatory delay-the decade or more that these services were technologically
feasible, and in place in other countries, but tied up here because of regulation
and litigation.
B. The UNE Fiasco
Rapid growth across the privatized segments of the telecom sector likely
lulled regulators into a false sense of confidence regarding their ability to design
a value-creating property rights structure for local competition. Post-socialist
reformers thought the same: just break up state-controlled resources and let the
market sort it out. Also, in the biomedical research area, there was an early
confidence that the fact of upstream privatization was crucial, but the structure of
the private property rights that were being created did not much matter. So, if
hotly competitive markets eventually had emerged in wireless or long distance,
then surely the same would happen in opening up local competition and
spurring investment in new facilities. Congress' 1996 Telecommunications Act
reforms instructed the FCC to create competition, but did not give much
efective guidance on how to structure and implement that task.
20
Much has already been written on how the Federal Communications
Commission translated the 1996 Act into practice. 2 The goal was to force the
incumbent local exchange companies (ILECs) to open up their networks so as
to allow new competitive local exchange companies (CLECs) to enter the local
telephone market. Because of the huge fixed network investments already in
place, it would have been inefficient for CLECs to recreate them from scratch in
their entirety, as if building multiple bridges over a small section of the
Mississippi River. So, new competitors were thought to need access to some
"essential" elements of this existing plant as they ramped up provision of their
own facilities-based competition.
More specifically, the FCC preempted state and local regulators, as a way
to break down all entry barriers for potential CLECs, and required ILECs to
share their existing facilities and services with the newcomers at government-set
prices. 2 The preemption part is not a problem. Indeed, stripping away
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and rent-seeking at the state and local
levels could be a valuable direction for further reform in the sector. The
problems arose in the second prong of the FCC implementation of the 1996
Act, which allowed new competitors to appropriate existing network facilities
and services.
2 Id. at 80-83 (contrasting Congress' "single sweeping and breathtakingly simple" statutory
language with the FCC's complex, heavily litigated attempts to implement that language).
See generally id passim.
22 Id. at 80.
Yale Journal on Regulation
In brief, the FCC interpreted the second part of its mandate to require the
ILECs to break down their integrated operations into fragments-unbundled
network elements (UNEs) including local loops, transport, and switching
23-
which would then be available to CLECs for their use in assembling and
providing new service. The notion was that CLECs would select the essential
features, functions, and capabilities that they needed to combine with their own
investments in new facilities to create new networks. Making UNEs available
to CLECs was supposed to be a transitional step to creating new firms, new
investment, and finally, competitive markets.
But the transition imposed hidden costs. The costs make sense once the
structure of property rights is understood. Property rights to use the ILECs'
facilities do not consist just in the physical parameters of the fragmented UNEs,
but also in the limits on use and transfer that are imposed. In other words, after
the FCC forces ILECs to market UNEs, they enter into a spiral of regulation.
Breaking up a network into fragments is a costly enough exercise, one that an
unregulated market player would be quite unlikely to undertake on its own.
But if ILECs did so, they would expect to recoup their investments in the
iagmentation process itself as well as pricing the fragments profitably.
Instead of allowing markets to price UNEs, which would be difficult given
the forced nature of the exchange, the FCC created an elaborate government-
controlled pricing scheme based on a complex and hypothetical notion of costs,
the so-called Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC)
methodology. 24 Using TELRIC methodology, UNEs are priced much below
the costs that the ILECs actually incurred in providing the facility or service, at
a price that does not allow them to recoup their investments in the network,
nor account for risk. 25 As anyone who has bought spare parts for a car knows,
parts are expensive, and a car built by buying a pile of spare parts would cost a
multiple of the assembled new car bought from a dealer. Similarly, one would
expect that in a well-functioning market economy, once UNEs are bundled back
together into a functional telephone platform, then the total cost might
approximate or exceed that already charged by the ILECs for that service. But
instead, the bundled price for unbundled elements, the so-called UNE-Platform
23 See id. at 5, 114-15; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 251(d)(2),
110 Stat. 56, 143; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)-(g).
24 HUBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 13, 15, 118-22 (defining TELRIC pricing). On UNE prices
by market, see Crandall et al., supra note 2.
25 ROBERT S. PINDYCK, MANDATORY UNBUNDLING AND IRREVERSTBLE INVESTMENT IN





(UNE-P), has been priced below simple resale of ILEC phone service. From a
21
market perspective, TELRIC pricing makes little sense.
In addition to fragmenting the physical system and mandating investment-
deterring prices for the resulting elements, the FCC has fragmented final pricing
authority and regulatory review among levels of governments.' 8 TELRIC
pricing would have been complicated enough if the FCC had operated as the
sole decision-maker. But, instead the FCC tried to push much of the operation
of the government price-setting system down to state and local regulators,
exponentially multiplying costs and further fragmenting control and operation
of ILEC facilities. Multiple local, state, and federal regulators can create
inconsistent regulatory schemes or layers of delay that operate to create a
regulatory anticommons--each regulator can slow down or block innovation by
an investor, but no one of them can credibly give a green light for large-scale
investments.
C. The Costs of UNE Fragmentation
The FCC's goal in fragmenting ILEC networks was to catalyze CLEC
investment in facilities-based competition.3 1 Not surprisingly, letting
newcomers pick out the most valuable pieces of the existing networks for a
nominal price did encourage firms to enter. During the past few years, both
CLECs and ILECs have responded predictably to the new property rights
regime, but not as the regulators had hoped. Instead of more investment and
innovation, UNEs and TELRIC have lead to less. 3' Indeed, it appears that the
lower a state prices IJNEs, the less facilities-based entry appears from CLECs. 2
This bad outcome should not be a surprise. In retrospect, it is puzzling how
the FCC could have thought that the particular path to competition that it
chose could have worked out differently.
26 Id. at 7 (noting resale discounts of 15% to 25% compared with 45% or greater discount
when same service purchased through UNE-P); Ingraham & Sidak, supra note 2, at 2.
27 PINDYCK, supra note 25, at 1-4 (arguing that the TELRIC pricing formula is not efficient
and that "it discourages investment by both incumbents and new entrants, and over the long run could
threaten the breadth and quality of the telecommunications infrastructure in the United States").
'8 Letter from Twenty-Two Economists to the President of the United States 2 (Mar. 25, 2004)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Economists' Letter] ("[T]he current regime allows state regulators
to establish the critical rules, which means there will be 50 different and frequently inconsistent
telecommunications policies with which to comply§, rather than just one. The problem is that
uncertainty deters investment."); HUBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90-91 (noting that more than 6000
agreements have been reached between ILECs and CLECs and submitted to state regulatory
commissions for review under the 1996 Act).
29 See Economists' Letter, supra note 28, at 2; Adam Thierer, Was the UNE Triennial Review
Worth the Wait? 58 TECIAKNOWLEDGE (Sept. 15, 2003), athttp://www.cato.org/tech/tk/030915-tk.html.
31 See Economists' Letter, supra note 28, at 2; Diane Katz, Telecom Victory, NAT'L REV.,
Mar. 3, 2004, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/commentkatz
200403030946.arp.
32 James Eisner & Dale E. Lehman, Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry, June 28,
2001, at 3 (draft on file with author) (finding that "states with lower UNE prices have less facilities-
based entry").
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1. CLECs and Facilities-Based Investment
One aspect of the UNE anticommons tragedy appears in how CLECs are
operating. CLECs have not bothered with much original investment in new
facilities because they have been able to acquire unfettered use of existing
facilities at nominal prices and with little risk. CLECs discovered that they
could build their service by cannibalizing the most profitable elements available
from the ILECs. Instead of creating competitors that could expand the pie, the
current regime just fragmented the existing pieces in such a way that no
competitor had a strong incentive to invest. 33 In sum, one aspect of
anticommons tragedy is that increasing the number of poorly incentivized
CLECs has meant deterring facilities-based investment by anyone. Why take a
chance building your own facilities or services when you can use the most
valuable pieces of someone else's business and back out of the deal with no
penalty if you so choose?
Another aspect of the telecom anticommons is that the existing property
rights regime has oriented CLECs towards regulatory arbitrage rather than
market-based competition. These new companies' survival relies on regulators'
favorable decisions on UNE availability and TELRIC rates.34 It becomes
worthwhile--even decisive-to invest in influencing those regulatory
decisions. But the companies have little incentive to invest in the facilities
themselves, in part because they can see how vulnerable hard assets are to
expropriation, and in part because they have gained little experience with
investing in physical assets.
Going forward, many CLECs are not well positioned to undertake the
next generation of investment. They have not had to learn how to build and
maintain extensive networks and facilities, nor have they had to compete at
market rather than TELRIC prices. These companies are not likely to be major
investors or innovators in broadband, nor substantial competitors for cable or
satellite providers of high-speed telecom services.
2. ILECs and the Legacy Facilities
A second aspect of UNE anticommons tragedy results from how ILECs
have responded to the new property rights structure. As an initial matter,
ILECs have reduced investment in their legacy facilities--defined as the ILEC
facilities that already existed at the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act. Why? Because the ILECs know that competitors can simply pick off the
33 Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 23 ("Entry based on UNE-P and resale of ILEC services
enhances competition only for marketing, customer service, and related functions, unless it facilitates
the transition to facilities-based competition. If CLECs can purchase unbundled network elements
indefinitely, it could discourage investment in facilities by both ILECs and CLECs.").
31 Ingraham & Sidak, supra note 2, at 2 (noting rapid stock price shifts for CLECs and ILECs
in response to potential FCC revisions to UNE-P access at TELRIC pricing).
Vol. 25:275, 2005
The UNE Anticommons
most successful investments and leave them with the failures. If CLECs can
appropriate a substantial share of the gains of new investment in the legacy
network, ILECs will cut back in investing.
3 5
Had the FCC decided that the legacy of existing networks and
infrastructure were of little value and could be run down to jumpstart something
new, then UNE fragmentation and the confiscatory TELRIC pricing system
might have made some sense (even if it would not have been fair to ILEC
investors). But the legacy system has substantial value in its own right, so that
wasting it through fragmentation and disinvestment may impose a large social
cost.
Second, along with deterring investment, implementing the UNE and
TELRIC system has been expensive, imposing administrative costs that appear
to be a deadweight loss. The ILECs have had to divert substantial resources
away from productive uses to manage instead this new regulatory regime. Each
of the thousands of interconnection agreements runs to thousands of pages.
Millions of performance metrics have to be collected and presented monthly to
federal and state regulators. Databases have to be created. Prices for every UNE
have to be calculated and fought over. Overall, the cost of operating the system
drains substantial resources and diverts management attention from prospective
investments to backward-looking and defensive strategies. Given that the UNE
and TELRIC system do not appear to have created entrepreneurial CLECs, the
costs associated with the system seem hard to justify.
Third, the UNE system forces ILECs to orient themselves towards
regulators rather than next-generation market competitors, such as cable or
satellite. So much of the ILECs' fortunes are tied up in managing and
extending their legacy investments that they cannot just write them off. The
existing networks provide the cash flow and credibility that back the ILECs'
ability to secure credit for future investments. To protect these investments, the
ILECs follow the CLECs into an expensive and escalating rent-seeking posture.
When regulators force hostile parties to share scarce resources, the unsurprising
result is endless and expensive litigation and lobbying. Together, these costs
can easily consume a substantial percentage of the resources that would
otherwise be available for productive investment or innovation.
In sum, regarding legacy facilities, a cost of the UNE anticommons
include lowered ILEC investment, dissipation of revenues in administration
and compliance, and diversion of management resources to rent-seeking. ILECs
are progressively disabled even in managing the legacy resources under their
control.
3 7
35 Gilder, supra note 1.
37 Arrow et al., supra note 3, at 13 ("It is our view that the unbundling requirements that the
FCC has imposed ... generally threaten further technological gains by adversely affecting ILECs' and
CLECs' incentives to invest in providing new services and upgrading their networks. This, in turn,
could harm consumer welfare.").
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3. ILECs and New Investment
The UNE anticommons imposes a final set of costs in terms of ILEC
investment in next generation telecom technology, such as high speed optic
fiber, also known as broadband. The FCC has attempted to deal separately with
construction of this next stage by not including new broadband fiber as an
element subject to unbundling.38 In other words, the FCC seems to have hoped
that ILECs would treat existing facilities as sunk costs from a heavily-regulated
past, while new facilities would be created in a competitive market. But this
separation of new broadband fiber from already-existing slow copper wire, also
called "narrow-band," proves partial and artificial.
First, the most valuable initial sites for broadband tend to be the densest
urban areas, what are called overbuild or "brownfield" areas. For these areas,
the FCC's exemption for broadband does not apply.3 9 ILECs are again forced
to share control over fiber under certain circumstances and up to certain levels
so that the FCC is diluting the positive incentives it had hoped to create
regarding prospective investment. While it may sound easy to partition discrete
portions of new broadband fiber, it is costly to do so. To paraphrase Robert
Ellickson, a guard dog can easily patrol the boundaries of private property,
keeping outsiders off. But if people have the right to come onto land for some
purposes and not others, then the cheap mechanism of a guard dog will not
serve.40 Policing shared use--especially when the sharing is forced by
regulators on unwilling owners-is far more expensive than patrolling borders.
Further, creeping regulatory action in cutting edge technology can be
demoralizing for potential investors. The unwillingness that comes from
demoralization is a social cost, as Frank Michelman taught in his discussion of
regulatory takings law.4 The FCC's cavalier attitude about compensation for
CLECs' use of legacy facilities, evidenced by the TELRIC standards, could
demoralize ILECs and their potential investors and creditors going forward.
The alternative to demoralization would be fully compensatory pricing for
network elements, what Michelman called settlement costs, that is paying the
ILECs more or less market value prices for use of their networks.
Broadband requires an enormous up-front investment, one that must be
recouped over many years. How does one evaluate the soundness of a
broadband investment if there is a non-trivial chance that the FCC will at some
" FCC Triennial Review Order, 2003 (lifting unbundling requirements for much new
broadband to encourage ILECs to invest in this area), quoted in Jay Lefkowitz, What the FCC Can Do
for the Economy, 9 WKLY. STANDARD 19 (2004), available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content Pubtic/Articles/000/000/003/618ydyfg. asp.
39 See Gilder, supra note 1 (arguing that "the emancipation of broadband must cover all
broadband, not just 'green field' projects or 'new fiber' or wireless in the high microwave bands");
Lefkowitz, supra note 38.
40 Robert C. Ellickson, Property inLand, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1382 (1993).
4' Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967).
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point force the network open to rivals, who reap the benefits while skirting the
risk. Thus, a hidden cost of the UNE anticommons is that it deters investment
going forward. Michelman teaches that if the regulator will not pay settlement
costs to ILECs, making them indifferent to whether rivals use UNEs, then
instead society suffers demoralization costs from people's knowledge that they
42
too may find their property expropriated without compensation.
Third, even if the FCC avoids the UNE anticommons by abandoning this
aspect of its implementation of the 1996 Act, they may still create a regulatory
gridlock by continuing to fragment decision-making authority among federal,
state, and local officials. Each additional toll on the regulatory approval
highway makes broadband less and less attractive an investment.43
So, the tragedy of the UNE anticommons, with its forced sharing of legacy
facilities, has multiple costs. It creates a world of CLECs that have little
incentive to invest and little taste for innovation. It directs both CLECs and
ILECs towards rent-seeking rather than market competition, towards fights over
a shrinking pie rather than innovations to create a larger one. It imposes
regulatory costs that could have been more productively invested, and finally, it
saps the will of both CLECs and TLECs to invest in the next generation of
technology.
IV. Conclusion
The United States is losing its competitive edge in telecommunications
in part because of FCC mistakes in fragmenting property rights during the
reform of local telephone service. Forcing ILECs to share their facilities with
CLECs proves costly to all. Replacing market prices with regulated rates
pushes all the players to focus on rent-seeking rather than competition. Each
seeks to cannibalize the resources of the others, shrinking and redistributing the
pie.
As with post-socialist transition, FCC reformers created a "tragedy of the
anticommons" in which too many market players and regulators each block the
others' investments and all forgo innovation. By forcing existing companies to
unbundle network elements and sell them too cheaply, the FCC has created an
industry where existing players are demoralized and have little incentive to
invest in the next generation of innovation.
42 See Lefkowitz, supra note 38. ("[T]he companies that have the money to invest in these
new networks are still being thwarted by an uncertain and often contradictory regulatory
landscape.").
43 See Economists' Letter, supra note 28, at 2 ("[Tihe broadband market has been left to the
devices of state and local officials who have proceeded to regulate it into something close to inertia.").

